From 5b6902006cecfc3a664720dca8c88fbb4249d467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hunter Bown <hmbown@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 21:39:23 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] security(mcp): defuse GitGuardian Basic-Auth-String false
 positive in proxy-redact test
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GitGuardian's "Basic Auth String" detector flagged commit 09dcbede0
because the test fixture for `redact_proxy_userinfo_strips_password`
contained literal URL strings of the shape
`scheme://username:password@host` — `alice:hunter2` and `bob`. The
values are obvious placeholders (not real credentials), but the
detector's regex is shape-based: any scheme-prefixed colon-separated
userinfo segment terminated by `@` matches, regardless of whether the
content is a real secret.

The test still needs to exercise the redaction logic for credential-
carrying proxy URLs. Fix: assemble the URLs via `format!` from
explicit placeholder constants (`PLACEHOLDER_USER`,
`PLACEHOLDER_PASS`) so the literal source text never contains a
contiguous `scheme://name:secret@host` pattern. Runtime behavior is
identical — `redact_proxy_userinfo` receives the same string and
returns the same redacted form.

Also reworded the function docstring (line 61) and the inline comment
at the warning log site (line 993) to describe the userinfo segment
without spelling out a literal `user:pass@host` shape that the same
detector could later trip on.

Two preexisting fixtures elsewhere in this file
(`mask_url_secrets("https://user:s3cret@…")` at line 3155 and its
docstring at line 46) have been on `main` for several releases and
are presumably already on GitGuardian's allowlist — left untouched
in this commit so the fix scope stays minimal. If they re-fire on a
future scan, the same `format!` pattern can be applied there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 crates/tui/src/mcp.rs | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crates/tui/src/mcp.rs b/crates/tui/src/mcp.rs
index 8fd68428..9e98e281 100644
--- a/crates/tui/src/mcp.rs
+++ b/crates/tui/src/mcp.rs
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ fn mask_url_secrets(url: &str) -> String {
     url.to_string()
 }
 
-/// Redact the `user:pass@` userinfo segment from a proxy URL so it can be
-/// safely included in `tracing::warn!` output without leaking the
+/// Redact the userinfo segment (`username[:password]@…` portion) from
+/// a proxy URL so it can be safely included in `tracing::warn!` output
+/// without leaking the
 /// password into the on-disk log. URLs without userinfo are returned
 /// unchanged. Garbage input (no `://` scheme separator) is also returned
 /// unchanged — the malformed-URL warning path is the only caller, so an
@@ -990,8 +991,9 @@ impl McpConnection {
                         client_builder = client_builder.proxy(proxy);
                     }
                     Err(err) => {
-                        // Redact userinfo (`user:pass@host` form) before
-                        // logging so an HTTPS_PROXY that embeds credentials
+                        // Redact userinfo (the `username[:password]@…`
+                        // portion of the URL) before logging so an
+                        // HTTPS_PROXY that embeds credentials
                         // (common in corporate setups) doesn't leak the
                         // password to the on-disk `~/.deepseek/logs/`.
                         let proxy_redacted = redact_proxy_userinfo(&proxy_url);
@@ -3174,14 +3176,22 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn redact_proxy_userinfo_strips_password() {
         // Corporate-style proxy URL with embedded creds — the
-        // password must never reach the on-disk log file.
-        let redacted = redact_proxy_userinfo("http://alice:hunter2@proxy.example/");
+        // password must never reach the on-disk log file. URL strings
+        // are assembled from placeholder constants via `format!` so the
+        // literal source never contains a scheme-prefixed username +
+        // password pair (colon-separated, `@`-terminated) that
+        // GitGuardian's "Basic Auth String" detector would flag as a
+        // committed credential.
+        let (placeholder_user, placeholder_pass) = ("PLACEHOLDER_USER", "PLACEHOLDER_PASS");
+        let with_creds = format!("http://{placeholder_user}:{placeholder_pass}@proxy.example/");
+        let redacted = redact_proxy_userinfo(&with_creds);
         assert_eq!(redacted, "http://***@proxy.example/");
-        assert!(!redacted.contains("hunter2"));
-        assert!(!redacted.contains("alice"));
+        assert!(!redacted.contains(placeholder_pass));
+        assert!(!redacted.contains(placeholder_user));
 
         // User only (no password) — still redacted.
-        let redacted = redact_proxy_userinfo("https://bob@proxy.example:8080");
+        let with_user_only = format!("https://{placeholder_user}@proxy.example:8080");
+        let redacted = redact_proxy_userinfo(&with_user_only);
         assert_eq!(redacted, "https://***@proxy.example:8080");
 
         // No userinfo segment — pass through.