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fix: resolve clippy warnings for Rust 1.95 — vec_init_then_push, unnecessary_map_or

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Hunter Bown
2026-05-26 12:13:30 -05:00
parent e59925f8f1
commit e5e34d4063
2 changed files with 32 additions and 35 deletions
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crates/tui/src/sandbox/mod.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ mod tests {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let marker = env.env.get("DEEPSEEK_SANDBOX");
assert!(marker.map_or(true, |v| v != "bwrap"));
assert!(marker.is_none_or(|v| v != "bwrap"));
}
let _ = env;
}
crates/tui/src/sandbox/seccomp.rs
+31 -34
View File
@@ -276,40 +276,37 @@ pub fn apply_seccomp_filter() -> std::io::Result<()> {
];
// Build the BPF program.
let mut filter = Vec::<sock_filter>::new();
// Instruction 0: load architecture from seccomp_data.arch
filter.push(sock_filter {
code: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: 4, // offset of arch in seccomp_data
});
// Instruction 1: compare with AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
// If match, jump to next instruction; if not, kill process
filter.push(sock_filter {
code: BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ,
jt: 0,
jf: 1, // jump 1 forward (to KILL) if arch doesn't match
k: AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
});
// Instruction 2: KILL (wrong architecture)
filter.push(sock_filter {
code: BPF_RET,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS,
});
// Instruction 3: load syscall number from seccomp_data.nr
filter.push(sock_filter {
code: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: 0, // offset of nr in seccomp_data
});
let mut filter = vec![
// Instruction 0: load architecture from seccomp_data.arch
sock_filter {
code: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: 4, // offset of arch in seccomp_data
},
// Instruction 1: compare with AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
// If match, jump to next instruction; if not, kill process
sock_filter {
code: BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ,
jt: 0,
jf: 1, // jump 1 forward (to KILL) if arch doesn't match
k: AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
},
// Instruction 2: KILL (wrong architecture)
sock_filter {
code: BPF_RET,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS,
},
// Instruction 3: load syscall number from seccomp_data.nr
sock_filter {
code: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
jt: 0,
jf: 0,
k: 0, // offset of nr in seccomp_data
},
];
// For each allowed syscall, add a compare+jump to ALLOW.
// We use a linear scan for simplicity: each JEQ instruction jumps