Hunter Bown
a3acdbe70b
Sweep brand mentions of `DeepSeek TUI` / `deepseek-tui` / bare `deepseek` (the dispatcher binary) across all user-facing docs to the new `codewhale` brand. The DeepSeek **provider** integration is left untouched throughout: env vars (`DEEPSEEK_*`), model IDs (`deepseek-v4-pro`, `deepseek-v4-flash`, `deepseek-chat`, `deepseek-reasoner`), the `api.deepseek.com` host, the `~/.deepseek/` config dir, and the `--provider deepseek` argument value all keep the legacy spelling. Anti-scope items deliberately left as the legacy `deepseek-tui`: - Homebrew tap and formula (`Hmbown/homebrew-deepseek-tui`, `brew install deepseek-tui`, `scoop install deepseek-tui`). The tap rename ships separately. - Docker image (`ghcr.io/hmbown/deepseek-tui`). Image-tag rename ships separately. - CNB mirror namespace (`cnb.cool/deepseek-tui.com/DeepSeek-TUI`). Third-party hosted path. - Security contact email (`security@deepseek-tui.com`). - GitHub repo URL (`Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI`). New artifact: - `docs/REBRAND.md` documents what changed, what didn't, the deprecation window, and migration commands for npm / Cargo / Homebrew / manual installs. CHANGELOG entries: - Root `CHANGELOG.md` and `crates/tui/CHANGELOG.md` both gain a new `[Unreleased]` section describing the rename and the one- release deprecation window. Historical entries are untouched. Issue templates: - `.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md` and `feature_request.md` refer to "codewhale" / `codewhale --version` instead of the old brand name in their environment fields. The rebrand sweep was driven by a perl script with bulk patterns (`deepseek-tui` -> `codewhale-tui`, `DeepSeek TUI` -> `codewhale`, bare `deepseek` -> `codewhale` with provider/model/host/env-var/ config-path negative lookbehind/lookahead) followed by targeted reverts for the anti-scope items above. Output was visually reviewed file-by-file before committing. Verified: - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --locked` — pass. - `cargo test --workspace --all-features --locked` — pass (no test source touched here; suite stayed green to confirm no doc-from-string assertions broke). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
70 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
70 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
|
|
|
|
codewhale is a coding agent with direct access to file operations, shell execution, and the network. Security disclosures are taken seriously.
|
|
|
|
## Supported Versions
|
|
|
|
Only the latest stable release receives security patches. No backports to older versions.
|
|
|
|
| Version | Supported |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| latest stable | :white_check_mark: |
|
|
| < latest | :x: |
|
|
|
|
Check the [releases page](https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/releases) for the current version.
|
|
|
|
## Reporting a Vulnerability
|
|
|
|
**Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
|
|
|
|
Report privately via one of:
|
|
|
|
- **GitHub private advisory**: [github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/security/advisories/new](https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/security/advisories/new)
|
|
- **Email**: [security@deepseek-tui.com](mailto:security@deepseek-tui.com) — include `[SECURITY]` in the subject line
|
|
|
|
Include in your report:
|
|
|
|
- A description of the vulnerability and the impact if exploited
|
|
- Steps to reproduce or a proof of concept
|
|
- Affected versions and configuration details
|
|
- Any suggested mitigation (optional)
|
|
|
|
## Response Timeline
|
|
|
|
| Phase | Target |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| Acknowledgment | Within 48 hours of receipt |
|
|
| Assessment | Within 5 days — triage severity, scope, and fix approach |
|
|
| Patch (critical) | Within 14 days from assessment |
|
|
| Patch (moderate/low) | Next feature release or per-maintainer timeline |
|
|
| Disclosure | After patch is shipped and users have had time to update |
|
|
|
|
You will receive status updates at each phase. If the timeline slips, we will communicate the reason and the revised estimate.
|
|
|
|
## Scope
|
|
|
|
### In scope (what counts)
|
|
|
|
- Remote code execution through crafted prompts or model responses
|
|
- Sandbox escape — breaking out of the YOLO-mode workspace boundary or shell `cwd` confinement
|
|
- Credential leak — exfiltration of API keys, tokens, or environment secrets
|
|
- Arbitrary file read/write outside the intended workspace (`PathEscape` bypass)
|
|
- SSRF via `fetch_url` or `web_search` against internal network endpoints
|
|
- Unauthorised MCP server access or tool invocation
|
|
|
|
### Out of scope
|
|
|
|
- Social engineering of the maintainer or contributors
|
|
- Denial of service / rate-limit exhaustion against the DeepSeek API
|
|
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report to the upstream project)
|
|
- Attacks requiring physical access to the victim's machine
|
|
- Theoretical ML-model injection attacks not demonstrated in the codewhale context
|
|
|
|
If you are unsure whether a bug is in scope, report it anyway. We will triage and respond.
|
|
|
|
## Hall of Fame
|
|
|
|
We maintain a hall of fame for reporters who submit verified security vulnerabilities. To be credited, include your preferred name / handle in the report.
|
|
|
|
*No entries yet — be the first.*
|